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A prevalent way in which social media and other digital technologies are currently 
framed is as hyper-connected, always on, affective and non-representational, and as 
involved in re-working boundaries between production and consumption, and 
between temporalities and spatialities. For example, Twitter describes its mission as 
“[t]o give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly, 
without barriers” (https://about.twitter.com/company), while Facebook explains its 
News Feed as “a regularly updating list of stories from friends, Pages, and other 
connections, like groups and events” (https://newsroom.fb.com/products/). 
Instagram describes itself as  
A fun and quirky way to share your life with friends through a series of pictures. 
Snap a photo with a mobile phone, then choose a filter to transform the image 
into a memory to keep around forever. We’re building Instagram to allow you to 
experience moments in your friends’ lives through pictures as they happen. We 
imagine a world more connected through photos’ 
(https://www.instagram.com/about/faq/).  
 
In these three brief, indicative examples, various social media platforms are depicted 
as spatial and temporal connections, enabling links between people and events to be 
shared in the moment, and perhaps also kept forever.  
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In this chapter, I focus on the ways in which social media is understood to be 
reworking time through its connectivity, immediacy and instantaneity. In particular, I 
suggest that social media may produce a particular kind of a ‘temporal present’1 
where bodies, technologies and the socio-cultural are intertwined and experienced in 
terms of ‘aliveness’2, and ‘always-on-ness’3. I suggest these qualities of social media be 
understood in terms of what Raymond Williams terms pre-emergence4. I draw on the 
materialist tradition of Williams and more recent new materialist approaches to media 
and culture, to consider whether and how social media constitutes an infra-structure 
of feeling, where data capture and connections between and across various platforms, 
devices and technologies are key, and through which practices such as linking, 
tagging and checking and affects such as compulsion, frustration, anxiety and joy are 
materialised. 
 
The ‘temporal present’  
One way to understand the kinds of temporality that are central to social media is in 
terms of the present. That is, the connectivity, instantaneity and constant availability 
of social media creates a present temporality; a temporality that is concerned with 
‘the now’, and that is stretched and condensed in various ways. It is important to note 
that such a temporality does not preclude the past or the future – as noted above, 
present events can be archived into the future, and as I discuss below, the present is a 
flexible temporality, potentially incorporating other temporalities. Furthermore, such 
a present temporality is affective; it is ‘fun’, ‘quirky’, and involves friends sharing 




Taking up Williams’ influential work on ‘structures of feeling’ can help to elucidate 
these points. For example, in his essay ‘Structures of Feeling’, Williams develops an 
account that seeks to comprehend culture not as ‘fixed forms’6 but as an ‘active’, 
‘flexible’, ‘temporal present’7. In this way, he aims to direct attention towards the 
dynamism of culture; rather than being analysed in terms of a ‘habitual past tense’, 
culture can and should (also) be understood as ‘this, here, now, alive, active’8. Such 
an approach to culture draws on the relationships between what he defines as 
‘dominant’, ‘residual’, and ‘emergent’ culture. Dominant culture refers to hegemonic 
culture9 and residual culture to what “has been effectively formed in the past, but is 
still active in the cultural process, not only, and often not at all, as an element of the 
past, but as an effective element of the present.”10 Of particular salience to a concern 
with a present temporality is emergent culture, which Williams describes as such:   
 
By ‘emergent’ I mean, first, that new meanings and values, new practices, new 
relationships and kinds of relationship are continually being created. But it is 
exceptionally difficult to distinguish between those which are really elements 
of some new phase of the dominant culture (and in this sense ‘species-
specific’) and those which are substantially alternative or oppositional to it: 
emergent in the strict sense, rather than merely novel. Since we are always 
considering relations within a cultural process, definitions of the emergent, as 
of the residual, can be made only in relation to a full sense of the dominant11. 
 
In this quotation Williams posits emergent culture as that which is both novel and 
new, and which is “substantially alternative or oppositional” to dominant culture. As 
such, dominant culture comes to stand for a “habitual past tense”12; that is an 
understanding of culture as fixed and finished. However, dominant culture occupies 
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an important position in Williams’ schema, as it enables both emergent and residual 
culture to be identified and made sense of. Thus, while he emphasises an 
understanding of culture as (a)live, he also maintains that there is a need to attend to 
the past (and the future, as I will go on to discuss).  
 
Williams goes on to offer a more complex account of emergent culture, naming what 
he terms ‘evident emergence’ and that which is pre-emergent: 
 
What matters, finally, in understanding emergent culture, as distinct from 
both the dominant and the residual, is that it is never only a matter of 
immediate practice; indeed it depends crucially on finding new forms or 
adaptations of form. Again and again what we have to observe is in effect a 
pre-emergence, active and pressing but not yet fully articulated, rather than 
the evident emergence which could be more confidently named (1977b: 126).  
 
Here then, Williams argues that what is most significant to an understanding of 
emergent culture is that which is “active and pressing but not yet fully articulated.” It 
is thus not a practice that can be readily identified or that already has a form, but that 
which is in itself in the process of emerging. Crucially, Williams argues that:  
 
It is to understand more closely this condition of pre-emergence, as well as the 
more evident forms of the emergent, the residual, and the dominant, that we 
need to explore the concept of structures of feeling.13 
 
Social media as pre-emergent  
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How might social media be understood as a “condition of pre-emergence”? What 
assistance does such an understanding contribute to an exploration of a structure of 
feeling? Again, turning to Williams’ work is productive. Published in the 1970s and 
1980s, Williams focuses on how a structure of feeling is generated by textual forms.  
For example, in ‘The Welsh Industrial Novel’14 he describes how nineteenth and 
twentieth century novels both capture and create a specifically ‘Welsh structure of 
feeling’15 that comes from the physical characteristics of Welsh industrial areas and 
the social relations and historical events that have come to compose its working life16. 
He tracks the emergence and development of this genre of writing, explaining how it 
moves from the experience of mass industrialization in Wales to its observation. It is 
only when it is able to observe, rather than experience the situation, that it becomes a 
coherent genre. Drawing on the distinction made between pre-emergent and 
emergent culture, what Williams is pointing to here is how, in the transformation 
from experience to observation, a particular genre is formed. Experience may be thus 
conceived as pre-emergent and observation as emergent. 
 
My suggestion is that social media is experiential, and hence is pre-emergent. It is a 
series of practices, activities, flows and events that, as Williams says, are not ‘fully 
articulated’ but hover ‘at the edge of semantic availability’17. Consider for example, 
how in the three examples introduced above, the emphasis is on what is happening. 
Twitter, Facebook and Instagram are platforms organised as feeds that are always 
updating, presenting a constant flow of images and text. These images and texts do 
not so much cohere as indicate the movement of data. As such, they are experienced 
more than they are observed.  
 
Affect: The pre-emergent 
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What is also suggested with the understanding of social media as pre-emergent is that 
the liveness and happening of social media is a situation that is experienced – felt – 
‘before’ it becomes something coherent. In this sense, the ‘pre’ of pre-emergence 
becomes particularly important. Moving from the cultural materialism of Williams to 
the new materialisms can help shed light on this ‘pre’. Some theorists see these two 
traditions as difficult to bring together – for example Joss Hands18 sees the new 
materialisms as failing to account for the social and cultural contexts in which 
technologies emerge, which is central to Williams’ arguments. However, in terms of 
my focus here, in both Williams’ and more recent approaches, sensation and feeling 
are identified as key means to understand the social world. For example, while 
Williams concentrates on structures of feeling as essential to comprehending the 
dynamism and activity of the social and cultural world, Celia Lury and Nina Wakeford 
propose the notion of ‘the happening of the social world – its ongoingness, 
relationality, contingency, and sensuousness’19. Furthermore, where Williams focuses 
on the pre-emergent as that which helps to make sense of a structure of feeling, 
Patricia Ticeneto Clough argues that social and cultural theory needs to attend to the 
infra-empirical – that is, how the “activity of our world today to a large extent takes 
place at time-space scales far finer than those of human perception, at the 
probabilistic scale of affect.”20 For Clough here, the social today operates not so much 
in terms of ideological interpellation, or subject formation, but through “affective 
modulation and individuation.”21 This is a social modulated at the edges of perception 
and consciousness22, through the “affective capacities”23 of both humans and 
technologies. Taking up Clough’s point, Williams’ identification of the significance of 
the emergence of the cultural and social is amplified today; what is in a state of pre-
emergence, what “hovers at the edge of semantic availability,” is increasingly not only 
the preserve of emergent culture, but what the dominant social and cultural ‘is’24.  
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As I have suggested, this state of pre-emergence is especially the case with social 
media. Social media data is created in real time through a range of different devices, 
and is collected and analysed in this ‘same’ time. While humans may be partly 
involved in these processes of creation, collection and analysis, they are only one 
aspect of it; technologies like mobile phones, swipe cards, and social media are 
involved in their creation, and computer technologies can analyse this data far quicker 
than humans. Thus, both users and analysts of social media experience rather than 
observe. The speed of this ‘real time’ experience may therefore be understood in terms 
of the present – it is not the fixed and finished ‘past tense’ but in Williams’ terms, is 
the ‘active’, ‘flexible’ ‘temporal present’. 
 
Furthermore, in more recent work Clough, Karen Gregory, Benjamin Haber, R. Joshua 
Scannell, argue: 
 
Big data doesn’t care about ‘you’ so much as the bits of seemingly random 
information that bodies generate or that they leave as a data trail; the aim is 
to affect or prehend novelty25  
 
The first part of this quotation emphasises the displacement of the human within the 
datalogical network – a key theme in work in the new materialisms, where humans 
may be one part of a network or series of connections, but not necessarily most 
important or at its centre. The second part is productive in terms of thinking about the 
pre- of the present, where the aim of big data is not only to care about what ‘you’ 
have done, so much as what you are doing and may do. To ‘affect or prehend novelty’ 
is for big data to “seek to prehend incomputable data and thereby modulate the 
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emergent forms of sociality in their emergence.”26 Big data is concerned with the 
emergence, or the ‘pre’, of the present. The present is flexible, happening, live – that 
is, is in the process of emerging. In this sense, it is future-oriented. 
 
Not only is the pre-emergent important to new materialist work, it has also been 
theorised by those working on affect. As a force that registers in the body before it 
may be comprehended or made sense of, affect is understood as physical or emotional 
states or activities that are pre-conscious27. Indeed, Brian Massumi suggests that one 
way to understand affect is in terms of a ‘missing half-second’; an activity that occurs 
in the brain – and this also might be extended to include the body more generally – 
prior to that activity being made conscious28. Specific affects that may be produced 
through engagement with social media, and digital media more generally, include, for 
example, a compulsion to frequently check on our own or friends’ Facebook posts, or 
our emails; the lure of the Twitter flow; an anxiety if we are away from our mobile 
phone; nerves about our laptop running low on battery; boredom at agreeing to terms 
and conditions during online shopping; frustration when internet pages take a while 
to load, or when updates to applications interrupt what we’re doing; joy at speaking 
to a friend on Skype; distraction by working across different screens; immersion in a 
Netflix box set… While some of these affective states might be articulable in/as 
language – frustration, anger, nerves, for instance – others may be vaguer, or not so 
easily expressed, and indeed might escape or exceed their expression in language. 
They hover “at the edge of semantic availability”29.  
 
Infra-structures of feeling  
Bringing together the materialist position of Williams and new materialist work on 
data and affect indicates that pre-emergence is a particularly significant aspect of 
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contemporary media culture. Drawing on both Williams’ definition of pre-emergence 
as the “active and pressing but not yet fully articulated,” and on the importance of 
what Clough terms the ‘infra-empirical’ to social media and digital culture, to 
conclude I suggest the concept of infra-structures of feeling as a helpful means of 
studying and making sense of such qualities of the present. The concept of infra-
structures of feeling is intended to account for both pre-emergence and for how this 
pre-emergence is organised and arranged. On the latter point, for Williams, a 
structure of feeling may be identified in a particular genre of literature or series of 
artworks (such as the genre of Welsh industrial novels). In terms of how the pre-
emergence of social media is encountered and experienced, it is worth considering the 
role of, for example, various digital devices, apps, platforms, and their associated 
practices, as contributing to an infra-structure of feeling. That is, rather than being 
located in one genre, social media works across a potentially diverse range of 
supporting structures. In this sense, the term ‘infra-structures of feeling’ seeks to 
account for the often neglected technological and institutional linkages or systems 
that are central to the organisation and functioning of social and cultural life30.  
 
As a term that also points to the ‘pre’ – that which cannot necessarily be articulated 
and is ‘just-before’ a practice that can be clearly identified – ‘infra’ also seeks to 
account for the affective dimension of the emergence of social media. Whereas 
Williams’ analysis was largely restricted to literary texts and art, I would like to 
enlarge his approach to consider texts more widely, as textures.  In particular, it is 
important to note that Williams’ concept of structure of feeling isn’t only a means of 
identifying a specific culture, but is also a methodology – the development of a mode 
of analysis that doesn’t split the personal and social, and convert the social to fixed 
forms. The term texture is then, perhaps, one way of ‘getting at’ the infra-structures of 
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feeling that are created through what hovers in everyday media experiences, 
practices, objects, devices.   
 
As well as expanding what might count as a text, 'texture’ is also a means of 
highlighting the affectivity of social media. Williams defines a structure of feeling in 
terms of a: 
 
[S]et, with specific internal relations, at once interlocking and in tension. Yet 
we are also defining a social experience which is still in process, often indeed 
not recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even 
isolating, but which in analysis (though rarely otherwise) has its emerging, 
connecting, and dominant characteristics, indeed its specific hierarchies31.  
 
There are clear connections to be made here between Williams’ understanding of a 
structure of feeling and how Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick defines texture as “an array of 
perceptual data that includes repetition” and that connects and distinguishes between 
different scales, “but whose organization hovers just below the level of shape or 
structure”32. Both emphasise process and emergence, and organisation and structure.  
In the way that I’m developing it, thinking through textures and infra-structures helps 
to grasp the ‘just-beforeness’ of the present. Indeed, expanding the notion of texts to 
‘textures’ is to respond to Williams’ argument that “the making of art is never itself in 
the past tense. It is always a formative process, within a specific present”33. Here, it is 
helpful to make a connection between this definition of texture and what Kathleen 
Stewart terms “ordinary affects”, which "work not through ‘meanings’ per se, but 
rather in the way that they pick up density and texture as they move through bodies, 
dreams, dramas, and social worldings of all kinds”34 A texture is a becoming, a 
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worlding. It is, in the terms that I have been developing here, an affective experience 
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